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Abstract
In October 2013, the European Union adopted a Directive,
which guarantees, inter alia, the right of access to a lawyer
to suspects of criminal offences from the outset of police
custody and during police interrogation. However, adoption
of the relevant legislation is not sufficient to ensure that this
right becomes effective in practice. A range of practical
measures will have to be taken by the Member States’
authorities and the legal profession to effectuate the imple-
mentation of the right to custodial legal advice. This article
aims to identify the practical factors that may influence the
implementation of the Directive, based on the findings of a
recent normative and empirical study conducted by the
authors. The research was carried out in four European juris-
dictions (England and Wales, France, the Netherlands and
Scotland), and it consisted of analysis of regulations, obser-
vations of daily practice in police stations, accompanying
lawyers who provided custodial legal advice, and interviews
with criminal justice practitioners. The article provides a
range of recommendations on the practical measures to be
undertaken by the EU Member States and national Bar asso-
ciations aiming at improving the protection of suspects’
rights in police custody in practice.
Keywords: legal advice, police interrogation, European
Union, England and Wales, France
1 Introduction
Access to legal assistance in police custody has become a
prominent issue in the national1 and European debates
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1. For an overview of the national policy debates and legislative measures
adopted to implement the Salduz v. Turkey judgment in the various
Member States, see, for instance, C. Brants, 'The Reluctant Dutch
Response to Salduz’, 15 Edinburgh Law Review 298 (2011), D. Gian-
noulopoulos, ‘“North of the Border and across the Channel”: Custodial
Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and in France’, 5 Criminal Law
Review 369 (2013); E. Myjer, 'One Salduz a Year is Enough. 20 Asso-
ciative Thoughts on Judge Rozakis, Judicial Activism and the Salduz
Judgment’, in D. Spielmann, M. Tsirli & P. Voyatzis (eds.), The Europe-
an Convention of Human Rights, a Living Instrument. Essays in Honour
of Christos L. Rozakis (2011) 419.
on criminal justice policy following a well-known
decision of the European Court of Human Rights
(hereinafter ECtHR) in Salduz v Turkey.2 In Salduz, the
ECtHR held that, as a rule, every suspect detained by
the police must benefit from access to a lawyer before
the first interrogation, unless there exist compelling rea-
sons to restrict this right.3 The legal standard establish-
ed in Salduz has been further confirmed, and expanded
upon,4 in more than one hundred judgments, commonly
referred to as the Salduz jurisprudence. This has enabled
the European Union to include strong provisions con-
cerning the right of access to a lawyer in police custody
in the newly adopted EU Directive on the right of
access to a lawyer and to communicate with third per-
sons (hereinafter the Directive).5 In particular, the
Directive provides that the competent state authorities
have a positive obligation to ensure effective access to a
lawyer to all detained suspects without delay upon the
deprivation of liberty.6 It also establishes the right of
every suspected or accused person to have a lawyer
present and to participate effectively when they are
questioned by the criminal justice authorities, including
the police.7
Adoption of the Directive is an important step towards
safeguarding the right to custodial legal advice for
suspects in the EU. However, as was demonstrated by
previous research,8 it is unlikely to be sufficient to
ensure effective protection of suspects’ procedural
rights. Besides respective legislation, Member States
2. Salduz v. Turkey, ECHR Grand Chamber (2008), No. 36391/02.
3. Ibid. at 54.
4. For instance, the 'Salduz jurisprudence' made it clear that the right of
access to legal advice applies during an interrogation of the suspect
(see, most recently, Navone and others v. Monaco, ECHR (2014), Nos.
62880/11, 62892/11 and 62899/11) and developed the conditions of
waiver of the right to legal assistance in police custody (see Section
2.2.2 below).
5. Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceed-
ings and in the European Arrest Warrant proceedings, and on the right
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to com-
municate with third persons and authorities when deprived of liberty,
OJ 2013, L 294/1.
6. See Arts. 3(1) and (2) and Recital 28 of the Directive on the right of
access to a lawyer, above n. 5.
7. Art. 3(3)b and Recital 25, ibid.
8. E. Cape, Z. Namoradze, R. Smith & T. Spronken, Effective Criminal
Defence in Europe (2010), E. Cape and Z. Namoradze, Effective Crimi-
nal Defence in Eastern Europe (2012), S. Schumann, K. Bruckmuller &
R. Soyer (eds.), Pre-Trial Emergency Defence (2012).
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should have procedures and institutional mechanisms9
in place to effectuate the various provisions of the EU
laws in practice. Furthermore, appropriate professional
cultures are needed to facilitate the implementation of
suspects’ procedural rights.10 This article presents an
analysis of some of the abovementioned practical factors
– namely, the existing procedures, institutional mecha-
nisms and professional cultures – that may influence the
implementation of the Directive. The analysis is largely
based on the findings of an empirical study carried out
by us (together with others), which were recently pub-
lished in J. Blackstock et al.,Inside police custody: an
empirical account of suspects’ rights in four jurisdictions
(hereinafter Inside Police Custody).11 In this study, we
undertook empirical research, observing daily practice
in police stations and accompanying lawyers who provi-
ded custodial legal advice in four jurisdictions within
the EU – England and Wales, France, the Netherlands
and Scotland – in the period of 2011-2013.12 We chose
France, the Netherlands and Scotland, because they had
undergone recent changes in their systems, allowing
access to lawyers before the first police interrogation fol-
lowing the Salduz judgment of the ECtHR in 2008.
England and Wales was included as a jurisdiction that
could offer examples of good practice, because there
custodial legal advice has been provided since the entry
into force of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(hereinafter PACE) in 1986. Based on the outcomes of
this research we were able to provide suggestions about
how to improve the protection of suspects’ rights in
police custody in practice.
This article consists of three parts. In Section 1, a brief
overview is given of the European standards on the right
to legal assistance in police custody, and in particular its
following elements: conditions for waiver of the right,
the right of timely access to a lawyer and the right of
access to a lawyer of one’s choice, the right to have a
lawyer present at suspect interrogations and the right to
effective assistance of a lawyer during suspect interroga-
tions. In Section 2, the article describes the findings of
the Inside Police Custody related to the abovementioned
elements of the right to custodial legal advice. The
objective is to identify the possible (trans-jurisdictional)
factors, other than the existence of relevant legislation,
which may influence the implementation of the
Directive. In conclusion, we formulate a number of rec-
ommendations on the implementation of the Directive.
9. Such as, for instance, procedures to verify the validity of waiver of pro-
cedural rights by suspects and accused persons, or organised services of
professional interpreters, available to provide interpretation at short
notice (as an example of an institutional mechanism necessary to effec-
tuate the right of suspects and accused persons to interpretation and
translation in criminal proceedings).
10. For example, an active professional culture of criminal defence. See
Cape et al. (2010), above n. 8, at 574.
11. J. Blackstock, E. Cape, J. Hodgson, A. Ogorodova & T. Spronken, Inside
Police Custody: An Empirical Account of Suspects’ Rights in Four Juris-
dictions (2014). This 2-year project was a collaborative effort of the
Maastricht University, University of the West of England, JUSTICE and
Warwick University and it was funded by the European Commission.
12. For more details concerning the research methodology of the study, see
section 4 below.
2 The European Standards on
the Right of Access to a
Lawyer in Police Custody
For a long time, the Council of Europe and the
European Court of Human Rights had been the only
institutions to generate Europe-wide standards on the
suspects’ procedural rights in criminal proceedings.13
Recently, however, the European Union emerged as a
significant player in this area. In 2009, the Roadmap on
the suspects’ procedural rights was adopted, a legislative
and policy programme aimed to strengthen the
procedural rights of suspects and accused in criminal
proceedings across the EU.14 In 2012-2013, three Direc-
tives on various suspects’ procedural rights were adop-
ted.15 Other instruments are envisaged, namely, on the
right to legal aid in criminal proceedings, on the rights
of vulnerable suspects, the presumption of innocence
and pre-trial detention.16
2.1 Relationship between the ECHR and the
Directive
One of the purposes of the Directive is to codify and
reinforce the provisions of the ECHR and ECtHR case
law.17 Thus, for the most part, the Directive repeats the
respective standards derived from the ECtHR case law.
13. These standards were mostly derived from Art. 6 of the ECHR encom-
passing the right to a fair trial of everyone charged with a criminal
offence.
14. Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap with
the view to fostering protection of suspected and accused persons in
criminal proceedings (2009), OJ C 295/1.
15. Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in crimi-
nal proceedings (2010), OJ L 280; Directive 2012/13/EU of the Europe-
an and the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5.
16. Proposal for a Commission Recommendation on procedural safeguards
for vulnerable persons suspected or accused in criminal proceedings
C 8178/2 (2013), unpublished, available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/
justice/ criminal/ files/ c_ 2013_ 8178_ en. pdf>; Proposal for a Directive of
the European Parliament and the Council on procedural safeguards for
children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings
COM(2013)822/2, unpublished, available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/
justice/ criminal/ files/ com_ 2013_ 822_ en. pdf>; Proposal for a Directive of
the European Parliament and the Council on provisional legal aid for
suspects or accused persons deprived of liberty and legal aid in Europe-
an arrest warrant proceedings COM(2013)824 final, unpublished, avail-
able at: <http:// eur -lex. europa. eu/ LexUriServ/ LexUriServ. do ?uri= COM:
2013: 0824: FIN: EN: PDF>; Proposal for a Commission Recommendation
on the right to legal aid for suspects or accused persons in criminal pro-
ceedings C 8179/2 (2013), unpublished, available at: <http:// ec. europa.
eu/ justice/ criminal/ files/ c_ 2013_ 8179_ en. pdf>; Proposal for a Directive
of the European Parliament and the Council on the strengthening of
certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be
present at trial in criminal proceedings COM(2013)821/2, unpublished,
available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/ justice/ criminal/ files/ com_ 2013_ 821_
en. pdf> (last visited 18 December 2013).
17. For a number of reasons described elsewhere, the ECHR enforcement
regime is believed to be less capable that of the EU to ensure compli-
ance of the national authorities with their obligations to safeguard sus-
pects’ procedural rights. Thus, additional legislative action from the EU
was deemed necessary to ensure that the standards related to the pro-
cedural rights of suspects found in the ECtHR case law were consistent-
ly implemented by the EU Member States. See Cape et al. (2010),
above n. 8 at 13.
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At times, however, it expands the ECtHR standards by
providing detail concerning the mechanisms of their
implementation. For illustration, the provisions of the
Directive on verification of the waiver of the right to
legal advice18 build up upon the ECtHR case law con-
cerning waiver of procedural rights.19 On the other
hand, the Directive does not cover certain issues
addressed in ECtHR case law, or the standards found in
ECtHR case law are more detailed than those of the
Directive. One example is the right of access to a lawyer
of one’s choice, which is not mentioned in the Directive.
Where the standards found in the ECtHR case law are
more developed than those of the Directive, they must
be taken into account when interpreting the respective
Directive provisions. That is, inter alia, because Recital
53 to the Directive states that ‘the Member States
should ensure that the provisions of this Directive,
where they correspond to rights guaranteed by the
ECHR, are implemented consistently with those of the
ECHR and as developed by case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights.’ This effectively means, in our
view, that the Member States must incorporate in their
implementing legislation not only the provisions of the
Directive but also the ECHR norms and ECtHR case
law relevant to the right of access to a lawyer in criminal
proceedings. Furthermore, the competent EU institu-
tions will arguably need to take into
account these standards and norms when assessing
compliance of the Member States with the Directive as
provided for in Article 16.20
Moreover, the respective ECHR standards may in the
future be incorporated into the Directive by the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which is ves-
ted with the authority to provide interpretations of EU
law provisions, binding on the Member States.21 The
need for the CJEU to take into account the ECHR stan-
dards when interpreting provisions on the fundamental
rights (including the right to a fair trial)22 is explicitly
provided for in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.23 In the recent years, the number of references
made by the CJEU to the ECHR and ECtHR case law
has increased.24 Furthermore, after the EU accession to
the European Convention of Human Rights mandated
18. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 9.
19. See section 3.1 below.
20. Art. 16 of the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer provides that
‘the European Commission shall, by 28 November 2019, submit a
report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the
extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures
in order to comply with this Directive.’
21. Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
22. Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for a right for
a fair trial and effective remedy.
23. Art. 53(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that ‘The
CJEU must give provisions of the Charter modeled on provisions of the
ECHR similar meaning’. The Charter of Fundamental Rights became
legally binding after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
24. See A.S. Arnaiz and A.T. Perez, ‘Main trends in the recent case law of
the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in the
field of fundamental rights’, Study Prepared for the European Parlia-
ment’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (2012), at
13.
by the Treaty of the European Union,25 CJEU will
apply the ECHR standards directly as EU law. For all
the reasons mentioned above, it is very likely that the
CJEU will rely on the ECHR standards when interpret-
ing the provisions of the Directive on the right of access
to a lawyer.
3 The Elements of the Right of
Access to a Lawyer
The right to effective access to legal assistance encom-
passes many elements.26 In this article, however, we
focus on five particular aspects of the right to legal
advice, which have figured most prominently in our
empirical study (focused on the stage of the first police
interrogation).27 Four of them are mentioned in the
Directive, namely, the conditions of waiver of the
right,28 the right of timely access to a lawyer,29 the right
to have a lawyer present at suspect interrogations,30 and
the right to effective participation of a lawyer during
interrogations of a suspect.31 The fifth aspect of the
right to effective legal advice, which we focus on is in
this article, namely, the right to a lawyer of one’s choice,
is not explicitly provided for in the Directive,32 but it is
contained in the ECHR.33 Nonetheless, it is relevant for
our analysis, because as it is argued in Section 2.1 above,
it may be 'read into' the Directive in the implementation
process or by means of interpretative judgments of the
Court of Justice of the European Union.
3.1 Waiver of the Right to Legal Advice
The conditions for a valid waiver, including the respec-
tive informational duty of the authorities, are listed in
Article 9 of the Directive. Namely, the waiver is condi-
tional upon the fact that the authorities have provided
suspects with clear and sufficient information in simple
and understandable language about the content of the
right to legal assistance and the consequences of waiving
it.34 Furthermore, the authorities must make sure that
the waiver was voluntary and unequivocal.35 In our
view, the duty to inform about the consequences of
waiving the right to legal advice also implies the obliga-
tion to inform the suspect about the offence(s) he is sus-
pected of, which is already provided for in the Directive
on the right to information in criminal proceedings.36
25. Art. 6(2) of the Treaty of the European Union.
26. E.g. the right to have confidential meetings with the lawyer, or the right
to have a lawyer present at the investigative actions undertaken by the
police, if provided by national law. See Directive on the right of access
to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 3(2)(b) and (4).
27. See Blackstock et al., above at 11, Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
28. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 9.
29. Ibid., Art. 3(2).
30. Ibid., Art. 3(3)(b).
31. Ibid.
32. See section 2.1 above.
33. Art. 6(3)(c) ECHR.
34. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 9(1)(a).
35. Ibid., Art. 9(1)(b).
36. Ibid., Art. 6.
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This information appears necessary, inter alia, so that
the suspect could decide whether the seriousness of the
charge warrants the presence of a lawyer.37
The waiver and the circumstances of the waiver must be
recorded.38 By definition, a waiver cannot be considered
voluntary where the police sought to discourage the
suspect from exercising the right. This may include
providing clearly inaccurate information, whether
deliberately or not (e.g. telling the suspect that he will
have to pay for a lawyer, whilst legal advice is free of
charge), or misleading suspects in more subtle ways, e.g.
telling them that if they ask for a lawyer it will take lon-
ger, whilst in reality the length of detention does not
always depend on the suspect’s decision to see a lawyer.39
The conditions for a waiver must be met particularly
strictly where vulnerable suspects are concerned. Where
a vulnerable suspect is involved, the authorities should
have taken all reasonable steps to ‘ensure that a vulner-
able suspect is fully aware of his rights of defence and
can appreciate, as far as possible, the consequences of
waiving them.’40 Furthermore, where vulnerable sus-
pects are concerned, waiver of the right to legal assis-
tance during police custody must be explicit.41 An
implicit waiver made by a vulnerable suspect, for exam-
ple by signing the information form about the rights and
agreeing to respond to interrogation, will not be valid
under ECtHR case law.42 The proposed instruments on
the rights of vulnerable suspects in criminal proceedings
in the EU recently made public by the European Com-
mission43 go even further by suggesting that certain
groups of vulnerable suspects should never be allowed
to waive their right to legal advice. Specifically, accord-
ing to a proposed Directive on procedural safeguards for
children, legal assistance in criminal proceedings for
children should be mandatory, except for very minor
cases.44 Furthermore, the draft recommendation on pro-
cedural safeguards for vulnerable persons suggests that
criminal suspects who cannot follow and understand the
proceedings should also be unable to waive their right to
legal assistance.45
3.2 Timely Access to a Lawyer during Police
Custody
According to the Directive, suspects or accused persons
must be provided with access to a lawyer without undue
37. Empirical studies have systematically shown that the seriousness of the
offence was an important factor affecting the suspects’ decision to
request legal assistance. See e.g. L. Skinns, ‘"Let’s get it over with”: ear-
ly findings on the factors affecting detainees’ access to custodial legal
advice’, 58 Policing & Society, at 64-5 (2009), and other studies listed
under n. 35 in P. Pleasance, V. Kemp & N. Balmer, ‘The Justice Lottery?
Police Station Legal Advice 25 Years on from PACE’, 3 Criminal Law
Review (2011).
38. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 6(2).
39. For discussion of the related practice, see section 4.1.2.
40. Panovits v. Turkey, ECHR (2008), No. 4268/04, 68.
41. Ibid.
42. Plonka v. Poland, ECHR (2009), No. 20310/02, 37.
43. Above n. 16.
44. Ibid., Art. 6.
45. Above n. 16, para. 11.
delay after the moment of deprivation of liberty.46
Thus, the Directive makes it clear that the right applies
from the outset of police custody, and not only if and
when a detained suspect is interrogated by the police.
This resolves any uncertainties of interpretation of the
existing ECtHR case law on the matter.47
The Directive furthermore provides that Member
States must ensure timely access to a lawyer,48 and that
in any case the suspect should have the possibility to
meet in private with his lawyer before any questioning.49
Besides, it requires that Member States ‘shall make the
necessary arrangements to ensure that suspects or
accused persons who are deprived of liberty shall be in a
position to practically and effectively exercise their right
of access to a lawyer.’50 It follows from the Directive
and the relevant ECtHR case law that the police are not
entitled to interrogate a suspect who has not had a prior
consultation with the lawyer, unless he has validly
waived such right before the interrogation.51 The only
situations where a derogation is possible are mentioned
in the Directive, and they include circumstances where
there is a pressing need to interrogate a suspect, for
instance, to prevent an imminent risk to life or destruc-
tion of evidence.52
3.3 The Right to Choose a Lawyer
Article 6(c) of the ECHR provides a right to all criminal
suspects to be defended ‘by himself or the lawyer of his
choice’. It is unclear however whether the right belongs
equally to suspects paying privately for the services of a
lawyer, as well as to those suspects whose lawyer is paid
for by the state.53 The ECtHR has held that the right of
choice of a lawyer is not absolute where a lawyer is paid
for by the state.54 Although the authorities must take
account of the wishes of the suspect to appoint a certain
lawyer – which underlines the importance of a relation-
ship of trust between a lawyer and a suspect – where it
concerns legally aided suspects, this choice may be over-
ridden ‘where there are sufficient and relevant reasons
to believe that the interests of justice so require’.55 The
proposed recommendation on the right to legal aid pro-
vides that, where suspects make use of a state-appointed
lawyer, ‘the preference and wishes of the suspects or
accused persons and requested persons should as far as
possible be taken into account by the national legal aid
systems in the choice of the legal aid lawyer.’56
46. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 3(2)(c).
47. Cape and Namoradze (2012), above n. 8, at 50-2; Salduz v. Turkey,
above n. 2; Zaichenko v. Russia, ECHR (2010), No. 39660/02; Dayanan
v. Turkey, ECHR (2009), No. 7377/03.
48. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 3(2)(c).
49. Ibid., Art. 3(3)(a).
50. Ibid., Art. 3(2)(b).
51. Ibid., Art. 3(3)(a) and Art. 8, Recitals 30-32; Pischchalnikov v. Russia,
ECHR (2009), No. 7025/04, 79.
52. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 3(6), Reci-
tals 31 and 32.
53. Cape et al. (2010), above n. 8.
54. Croissant v. Germany, ECHR (1992), No. 13611/88, 29; Lagerblom v.
Sweden (2003), No. 26891/95, 54.
55. Ibid.
56. Above n. 16.
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The requirement to respect the choice of a lawyer is
stricter in case of suspects who pay for lawyer’s services
privately; however, the ECtHR has ruled that the right
may also be limited ‘in exceptional circumstances where it
is necessary to override this right in the interests of
justice or where this is associated with justifiable and
significant obstacles.’57 It is unclear what these ‘excep-
tional circumstances’ may be, but arguably the authori-
ties’ wish to proceed with the interrogation despite the
temporary unavailability of a privately paid lawyer does
not constitute such circumstances.58
3.3.1 The Right to Have a Lawyer Present at
Interrogations and the Lawyer’s Role at
Interrogations
In line with ECtHR case law,59 the Directive provides
that all suspects should have the right to have a lawyer
present during their interrogations by police.60 The
Directive furthermore provides that a lawyer should be
able to ‘participate effectively’ in the interrogation, but
that such participation shall be in accordance with the
procedures under national law.61 However, such
procedures must not ‘prejudice the effective exercise
and essence of the right’.62 This is further explained in
Recital 25, which states that ‘the lawyer may, inter alia,
in accordance with such rules, ask questions, request
clarification and make statements.’
These provisions, in our view, should be interpreted in
line with ECtHR case law on the matter. Given that
according to the ECtHR the primary rationale for the
right to legal assistance during interrogations is to safe-
guard the suspect’s right to remain silent,63 the lawyer
must as a minimum be able to intervene to protect his
client’s right to silence and to prevent unlawful or unfair
behaviour of the police depriving the client of this right.
Furthermore, a lawyer should arguably be able to
exercise his ‘core’ function of providing confidential
advice to his client64 in the course of interrogation, and
subsequently to seek to stop the interrogation for this
purpose. Besides this, in line with another rationale of
the right of access to a lawyer in police custody – safe-
guarding the equality of arms, a lawyer should be able to
point to the elements of the case that are favourable to
his client, provide him with moral support and ensure
that the record of the interrogation is accurate.65
57. Dvorski v. Croatia, ECHR (2013), No. 25703/11, 94.
58. See, mutatis mutandis, Pavlenko v. Russia, ECHR (2010), No.
42371/02, 114. In this case, a violation of Art. 6(3)(c) was found,
because the authorities failed to react to applicant’s complaints about
ineffectiveness of his legally-aided counsel and requests to invite a pri-
vately-paid lawyer, because they wished to advance with the investiga-
tion.
59. Salduz v. Turkey, above n. 2 and subsequent judgments.
60. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 1(3)(b).
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Salduz v. Turkey, above n. 2, 54.
64. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Arts. 3(3)(a)
and 4.
65. See e.g. Dayanan v. Turkey, above n. 47. Also see the articulation of
the lawyer’s role during interrogation in Blackstock et al., above n. 11,
at 394-5.
4 The Right to Legal
Assistance in Police Custody
in the Four Jurisdictions
This section largely relies on the findings reported in
Inside Police Custody, as well as data not included in the
final publication.66 The study was a combination of legal
(normative) analysis and empirical research. Data were
collected on eleven sites67 across four jurisdictions.
Observations were carried out at police stations, as well
as at criminal law firms, or with individual lawyers par-
ticipating in police station legal advice duty schemes.68
Where the necessary permissions were obtained,
researchers spent at least 4 months observing at police
stations, and 2 months observing with the lawyers in
each jurisdiction.69 However, in some jurisdictions, we
were unable to obtain permissions to carry out (parts of)
the observations.70 This explains the differences in the
time spent by researchers in carrying out observations in
different jurisdictions, as well as the asymmetry in the
reported findings. In addition to observations, research-
ers conducted over eighty semi-structured qualitative
interviews with police officers and legal practitioners.
The methodology of the study is described in detail in
Inside Police Custody.71
4.1 Waiver of the Right to a Lawyer and
Informing Suspects about the Right
The issue of waiver of a procedural right is intrinsically
linked with the authorities’ duty to inform suspects
about this right in an effective way, including the
obligation to inform them about the consequences of
waiving the right. Thus, the paragraphs below will
cover the national regulations on waiver of the right to
legal advice, as well as on the procedures for informing
suspects about this right, and their application in prac-
tice in the studied jurisdictions.
66. Fieldnotes are referenced as follows: e.g. NethSite1Pol4 stands for the
jurisdiction (Neth), site number (Site1), observations with the police
(Pol) on the fourth day (4). Interviews are referenced as follows: e.g.
iEngSite2Law4 stands for the jurisdiction (England and Wales), site
number (Site2), fourth interview with a lawyer (Law).
67. For the purposes of our study, a 'site' corresponded to a judicial district.
The choice of the sites depended largely on our ability to obtain permis-
sions to carry out observations in the given district.
68. The arrangements for observations with lawyers differed per jurisdic-
tions. In France and in the Netherlands, researchers were attached to
individual lawyers who attended police stations under the framework of
police station legal advice duty schemes (see section 4.2.2 below). In
England and Wales, researchers were attached to criminal law firms.
69. See the overview of the data collection periods in Blackstock et al.,
above n. 11 at 561.
70. For instance, in Scotland researchers had limited opportunities to
observe with law firms and they had no access to suspect interroga-
tions. In France, we were unable to obtain permissions to conduct
observations at police stations, as well as (on one of the sites) with law-
yers attending police stations, despite lengthy negotiations. See Black-
stock et al., above n. 11 at 56-7.
71. See Chapter 2 in Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 37-69.
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4.1.1 Regulations on Waiver of the Right to a Lawyer in
Police Custody
In all studied jurisdictions, suspects of criminal offences
can waive their right to legal advice in police custody.72
None of these jurisdictions provides for mandatory legal
advice, where certain groups of suspects cannot waive
their right to a lawyer. The Netherlands is the only
country that has a system which resembles mandatory
legal assistance. Namely, in the Netherlands the police
must invite a lawyer to consult with all suspects who are
arrested in respect of most serious offences and with
minors younger than 16 years, before commencing the
first interrogation.73 However, after consulting with the
lawyer, these suspects may waive their right to (further)
legal assistance.
The regulations on informing suspects about the right
to legal advice vary greatly in the four jurisdictions.74 In
France and in the Netherlands, there is a general duty of
police officers to inform suspects about the right to cus-
todial legal advice, but there are no regulations as to the
form and manner in which this information should be
provided.75 In England and Wales, Code of Practice C
of PACE regulates the duty to inform about the right in
more detail, i.e. that it must be done in a clear manner,
orally and in writing, that suspects should be told
that they may see a lawyer at any stage of police custody,
etc.76
The most elaborate procedure of informing suspects
about their right to legal advice exists in Scotland. This
procedure77 was introduced by the national police
authority to implement the respective law,78 which was
adopted following the Cadder case.79 The so-called
Solicitor Access Record Form (hereinafter SARF) was
developed to ensure that suspects are informed about
their right to a lawyer in a uniform manner.80 The form
must be read verbatim, and it includes a number of
statements and questions concerning whether or not the
suspect understands the right to legal advice and wishes
to exercise it. The phrasing of the form itself is extreme-
ly unfortunate, as it is (four pages) long and repetitive
and uses complex language.81 Despite this, the same
form is used in respect of children and vulnerable sus-
pects.
Only in England and Wales is it required by law that, in
addition to oral notification about the right to a lawyer,
suspects were provided with written information about
72. Ibid. at 81, 97, 114, 133-34.
73. Aanwijzing rechtsbijstand politieverhoor 15 februari 2010, Stcrt. 2010,
4003.
74. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 214-16.
75. Ibid. at 91, 108.
76. PACE Code of Practice C, paras. 3.1-3.2.
77. See Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) Custody
Manual of Guidance (2010).
78. See S 15 (A) Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
79. In Cadder, the UK Supreme Court found that the use at trial of evi-
dence obtained during police interrogation without prior access to a
lawyer will irretrievably violate the right to a fair trial. Cadder v. HM
Advocate [2010] UKSC 43.
80. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 126.
81. Ibid. at 230-34.
the right to a lawyer.82 In other jurisdictions, standard-
ised written information is available, but there is no
obligation of the authorities to provide it to suspects.
All jurisdictions have some general legal norms in place
concerning the conditions for waiver of the right to legal
advice.83 These norms, contained in regulations or
developed by case law, usually require that the waiver
should be explicit and unequivocal and that it should be
recorded. However, in none of the four jurisdictions
with the (partial) exception of England and Wales, is
there a procedure in place to verify whether the waiver
is voluntary and informed.84 In England and Wales,
PACE Code C provides that if the suspect refuses to see
a solicitor, an officer must ask the person for the reasons
for such a decision.85 However, this procedure does not,
in our view, amount to a proper verification of the waiv-
er. That is because an officer is not obliged to inform
the suspect about the consequences of using or not
using the right and to ascertain that the suspect under-
stood them; nor is he expected to react in any way, if it
appears that the suspect did not understand the mean-
ing of the right or the implications of waiving it.86
The treatment of vulnerable suspects in relation to the
waiver of the right to a lawyer varies considerably in the
four jurisdictions. In none of these jurisdictions are
there any special procedures aimed at informing
vulnerable suspects about their right in a way that is
understandable to them, i.e. depending on the nature of
their vulnerability and their age.87 Only in the
Netherlands is there a provision, according to which
certain categories of suspects (e.g. children under the
age of 16) may waive their right to legal advice only after
a prior consultation with a lawyer.88 Another safeguard
meant to ensure that vulnerable suspects understand
their rights is the institution of an ‘appropriate adult’
that exists in England and Wales and in Scotland (but
82. Ibid. at 216.
83. Ibid. at 81, 97, 114, 133-34.
84. In Scotland, the ACPOS Manual of Guidelines on Solicitor Access pro-
vides that, as a pre-requisite of the valid waiver, suspects should be
asked whether they have understood their rights and whether they wish
to exercise them. This procedure, however, does not include an element
of verification of whether the suspects understood their rights and the
implications of waiver. See ACPOS Manual of Guidelines on Solicitor
Access (2011) at 10, 22.
85. However, if the suspect insists on the decision to waive the right, the
officer must refrain from asking the person the reasons for the decision
further. PACE Code of Practice C, para. 6.5, Note for Guidance 6K.
86. See Section 3.1 above.
87. Although in some jurisdictions, for instance in Scotland and in the
Netherlands, there is case law stating that in respect of (some) vulnera-
ble suspects, waiver of the right to legal advice should not be accepted
where they were informed about their right to legal advice in a way
usually practised in the given jurisdiction. See e.g. McGowanv. B.
[2011] UKSC 54, cited in Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at p. 134;
Rechtbank Arhnem (2010), LJN BN515; Rechtbank Amsterdam (2012),
LJN BY8839.
88. See above. In Scotland, The ACPOS Manual of Guidance for Solicitor
Access provides that for children and those aged 16 and 17 there is a
presumption that they should have access to advice from a solicitor and
every effort should be made to obtain those services. See Blackstock
et al., above n. 11 at 134. However, this provision is different in nature
from a duty to engage a lawyer to verify the validity of the waiver of
the right to legal advice.
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not in France and the Netherlands).89 An appropriate
adult is a parent, another relative or a social worker,
whose role is, inter alia, to help vulnerable suspects to
understand their rights, and to help them decide wheth-
er they wish to exercise them or not.90 An appropriate
adult may consider inviting a lawyer to a vulnerable sus-
pect if he believes it in the suspect’s best interest, even if
the latter indicates that he does not want legal advice,
but the suspect cannot be forced to see the lawyer if he
refuses to do so.91
4.1.2 Waiver of the Right to Legal Assistance and
Informing Suspects about the Right in Practice
The estimated rates of waiving of the right to legal
advice in police custody in the studied jurisdictions
were between 50 and 75%.92 These figures should be
treated with caution,93 but it is undisputed that in all
four jurisdictions a large number of suspects waive their
right to legal assistance.94
In none of the four jurisdictions did we observe suspects
being threatened or tricked by the police into waiving
their right to a lawyer. It may be, however, that the
inherent limitations on the design of our study prevent-
ed us from picking up appropriately on the instances of
serious police misconduct.95 At the same time, our
research has shown that the operation of the provisions
aimed at informing suspects about the right and to
verify the waiver was problematic in some ways in all
studied countries.
There was a striking difference in the four jurisdictions
in the way that the provision of information on rights by
the police to suspects was organised. England and Wales
and Scotland have a highly regulated structure, with
very strict recording procedures. The ‘booking in’ pro-
cess during which suspects are informed of their rights
is recorded on video. Furthermore, the officers dealing
with the booking in process, the so-called ‘custody
officers’, are senior-rank officers, whose only role is to
implement police custody procedures and who are not
in any way involved in case investigations.
89. In the Netherlands, juvenile suspects may be assisted by a 'trusted per-
son' during interrogation (as an alternative to a lawyer). However, the
role of a 'trusted person' is narrower than that of an 'appropriate adult'.
See Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 244.
90. See Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 245.
91. PACE Code of Practice C, para. 6.5A.
92. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 81, 97, 114, 133.
93. There were no reliable statistical data on the rates of waiver of custodial
legal advice collected on the national level in any of the four jurisdic-
tions. Most of the existing empirical studies of the uptake rates of legal
advice were conducted in England and Wales. However, the most
recent large-scale study was undertaken in this jurisdiction about
20 years ago (namely, in 1997). See Pleasance, Kemp & Balmer, above
n. 36 at 5-6. In the Netherlands, there was no available statistical data
at all; in France and in Scotland the only data available were the statis-
tics cited in government reports, the reliability of which could not be
verified. See Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 97, 114 and 134.
94. During our observations at the Dutch police stations, for instance, 45
out of 94 suspects waived their right to legal assistance. See Blackstock
et al., above n. 11 at 278.
95. The relatively short observation periods spent on the research sites may
have been insufficient to overcome any 'observer effect' caused by the
researchers’ presence. Besides, our study did not include interviews with
criminal suspects, which could have yielded different findings.
By contrast, in France96 and in the Netherlands, there
were far less detailed regulations or instructions as well
as fewer provisions to scrutinise or verify compliance.
As a consequence in the Netherlands, the manner of
informing suspects about the right depended greatly on
the officer’s own approach and style.97 For instance, we
observed some officers simply telling suspects that they
have the right to a lawyer and asking them whether they
wanted one;98 yet the majority also mentioned that a
lawyer was free of charge and/or that a suspect could
choose between an ‘own’ lawyer and the one contacted
by the police.99 Still, some officers added to this that
exercising the right to a lawyer will cause delay,100
whilst others encouraged suspects to take up legal advice
by asking the question twice or telling them that they
may change their mind later.101
In the Netherlands, the officers informing suspects
about the suspected offence and about their rights (so-
called ‘assistant prosecutors’) are senior police officers,
who are often involved in the investigation (e.g. in a
supervisory capacity).102 They may therefore have inter-
ests, which are in a direct conflict with the interest to
guarantee the effective exercise of suspects’ rights. One
obvious example is the interest to complete the investi-
gation as quickly as possible, which, as some officers
may believe,103 could be compromised when the suspect
uses his right to legal assistance. A minority of assistant
prosecutors in our study have given priority to the inter-
ests of the investigation when informing suspects about
their right to legal assistance.104 For instance, one older
assistant prosecutor observed in NethSite1 persuaded a
suspect, inter alia, to waive her right to legal assistance
to aid his younger colleagues to deal with the interroga-
tion in a speedier manner.105 Some assistant prosecutors
were also observed to ‘nudge’ suspects into waiving
their right to a lawyer, when there was a possibility to
'process' the case by means of an accelerated case
96. In France, we were unable to get a permission to observe at police sta-
tions, and thus we did not have a possibility to observe how suspects
were informed about their right to legal advice by the police, but we
could accompany lawyers to the police stations and interview them
about how suspects were informed.
97. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 217-26.
98. NethSite1Pol1; NethSite1Pol7; NethSite1Pol10.
99. See an example in Blackstock et al., above at 11 at 225; NethSite1Pol2;
NethSite1Pol6; NethSite1Pol7.
100. NethSite1Pol1; NethSite1Pol6; NethSite1Pol7; NethSite1Pol25. For the
discussion of this practice, see below.
101. See an example in Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at p. 229;
NethSite1Pol7; NethSite1Pol13; NethSite1Pol30.
102. For instance, they may hold senior positions in the investigation depart-
ment.
103. See the text belonging to n. 114 below.
104. We have also observed assistant prosecutors who made an extra effort
to ensure that suspects may benefit from the right to legal assistance.
For relevant examples, see Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 229.
105. This was a less serious offence (social benefits’ fraud), and the evidence
against the suspect was overwhelming. The suspect appeared highly
suggestible. The assistant prosecutor used the conversation aimed at
informing the suspect about the offence and her rights to persuade the
suspect to confess by confronting her with the evidence, as well as to
waive her right of access to a lawyer. See NethSite1Pol1. Blackstock
et al., above n. 11 at 279.
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disposal.106 This is to be contrasted with the situation in
England and Wales where the officers who deliver
procedural rights to suspects are not vested with any
investigation-related tasks. Besides, their duties to
inform suspects about their rights, and the manner in
which this should be done, are regulated in detail by the
respective legislation, which is not the case in the
Netherlands.107
In Scotland, as mentioned above, the SARF form pre-
scribes that officers use exactly the same wording to
inform all suspects about their right to custodial legal
advice. This form, however, was difficult to use, as the
sequence of the questions was illogical, they were repeti-
tive (e.g. asking whether a suspect wants legal assistance
in three different ways), the form itself was long-winded
and it used the language that most suspects were unlike-
ly to understand, such as ‘have intimation sent to a
solicitor’.108 In England and Wales, officers were guided
by the so-called ‘record of rights crib sheet’ (which was,
however, not mandatory to follow) when informing sus-
pects about their right to a lawyer. The crib sheet was
simply worded and included the essential information
about the right to free and independent legal advice.
Most officers employed a combination of reading from
the sheet verbatim, re-phrasing certain parts of it and
adding own explanations.109
Across all jurisdictions, information about the rights
– including the right to a lawyer – was provided differ-
ently to suspects who had no prior experience of police
custody and to those who were considered ‘regulars’.110
Officers generally took more time to explain the right to
legal advice to ‘first timers’, whilst ‘regulars’ were often
dealt with in a hasty manner, with some information
being omitted.
In all jurisdictions, there were indications that officers
sometimes let suspects know that if they request a law-
yer, they would remain in custody longer.111 Often, this
was not a conscious attempt to dissuade suspects from
taking up legal advice, but almost certainly it had such
an effect on some suspects. This is because the suspects’
emotional need to be released as soon as possible112 may
preclude them from reasoning rationally about the
necessity of legal advice. Besides, telling suspects that
exercising their right to a lawyer will lead to a delay is
often misleading, even if the officer genuinely believes
that it is accurate. Research carried out in England and
Wales has shown that the time spent waiting for a law-
106. Ibid. at 279-80.
107. See above.
108. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 232-33.
109. Ibid. at 228.
110. EngSite1Pol3; EngSite1Pol6; EngSite2Pol7; EngSite1Pol11; iEng-
Site1Pol2; ScotSite1Pol10; ScotSite2Pol25.
111. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 274; iEngSite1Pol2; iEngSite1Law1;
EngSite1Pol9; iFranSite1Law1; iFranSite1Law7. For the Netherlands, see
the examples cited above n. 100.
112. Previous research found that avoiding delay was one of the most com-
mon reasons, for which suspects refused legal assistance. L. Skinns,
‘Let’s get it over with; early finding of the factors affecting detainees’
access to custodial legal advice’, 19(1) Policing and Society 58 (2009);
V. Kemp, ‘"No Time for Solicitor”: Implications for Delays on the Take-
up of Legal Advice’, 3 Criminal Law Review 184 (2013).
yer’s arrival did not result in longer periods of police
custody.113 In the Netherlands, a recent empirical study
has shown that the fact that police had to wait for a law-
yer to arrive before interrogating a suspect prolonged
the time of police custody only unsubstantially, i.e. on
average for about 40 minutes, contrary to the officers’
perception that the resulting delay was about 2 hours.114
Only in England and Wales115 did we observe officers
asking suspects about the reasons for a waiver of the
right to legal advice (where this is also required by
PACE).116 In the other jurisdictions, by contrast, the
officers we observed did not inquire into the reasons for
the refusal. Where it was clear that suspects waived the
right, falsely believing that doing so would cause a long
delay, or that it would send a message to the authorities
that they are guilty, often police officers did not correct
them in these beliefs. For instance, in one case in
Scotland, an officer did not seek to correct the suspect,
who had mistakenly believed that waiting for a lawyer
would ‘take all night’ and therefore waived his right to
legal assistance.117 Such a waiver can hardly be
‘informed’, as it was clear that the suspect did not
understand the implications of exercising the right.
Practices for informing vulnerable suspects about their
right to legal advice, depending on the nature of their
vulnerability and age, were lacking across all four juris-
dictions. Police officers have readily recognised in inter-
views the challenges of informing vulnerable suspects
about their rights and of accepting a waiver of the rights
made by vulnerable suspects.118 None of the officers,
however, mentioned that they received any training on
this matter. In the Netherlands, for example, some
interviewed officers told us that they developed their
own approach to informing children about their rights,
for instance, by using a more empathetic tone119 and
simpler language ( ‘lawyer’ instead of ‘solicitor’)120 or
involving parents in making a decision.121 However,
despite the appreciation of the special needs of vulner-
able suspects expressed in interviews, both in the Dutch
and English sites we observed that the information
about the right to legal advice was sometimes provided
to such suspects in a perfunctory122 or hasty123 manner.
113. Skinns, ibid. at 64; V. Kemp, N.J. Balmer & P. Pleasance, ‘Whose Time
Is It Anyway? Factors Associated with Duration of Police Custody?’, 10
Criminal Law Review 736 (2012).
114. W.J. Verhoeven and L. Stevens, Rechtsbijstand bij politieverhoor
(2013), at 287, 295.
115. EngSite1Pol11; EngSite2Pol7.
116. See Section 2.1.1 above.
117. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 274.
118. Ibid. at 243-44.
119. iNethTownPol3; iNethCityPol5; iNethCityPol3; iNethTownPol4.
120. iNethCityPol2; iNethCityPol3.
121. iNethSite2Pol1; iNethSite2Pol2.
122. For example, NethSite1Law7 and NethSite1Pol13, where detainees with
suspected mental health issues were informed about their rights briefly
through a cell window, because the officers feared to provoke an
aggressive reaction from them if lengthier explanations were provided.
123. See, e.g., Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 245-46; EngSite2Pol5.
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4.2 Timely Access to a Lawyer of One’s Choice
Although the right of timely access to a lawyer and the
right of access to a lawyer of one’s choice were treated
separately in the sections concerning the respective
European standards,124 it is preferable to address them
together when discussing their implementation. That is
because, as our research has shown, in practice these
two elements are inter-related. Ensuring timely access
to a lawyer of one’s choice may be a much more chal-
lenging task than ensuring timely access to any lawyer.
Yet, as it will be argued below,125 access to a lawyer
whom a suspect knows and trusts is an important pre-
condition of effective legal assistance particularly in the
context of police custody. Appropriate measures must
be taken not only by the government and the law
enforcement authorities but also by the legal profession
to effectuate the right of timely access to a lawyer of
one’s choice in police custody. Relevant legislation is
important to ensure that any exceptions to the right of
access to one’s lawyer are narrowly defined, yet a whole
range of practical measures described below are needed
to ensure that the right becomes ‘practical and effec-
tive’.
4.2.1  Timely Access to a Lawyer of One’s Choice:
Legislative Framework
In all jurisdictions, suspects are entitled to have access
to a lawyer in police custody, and in any case – subject
to some exceptions – before the first interrogation. In
England and Wales and in France, access to a lawyer
may be delayed for a limited time126 and in limited cir-
cumstances. In England and Wales, these include the
situations where, for instance, there are grounds to
believe that the solicitor will cause an interference with
the investigation (e.g. by tampering with evidence), and
it is only possible in serious cases.127 The circumstances
in which these provisions may be applied are further
limited by case law.128 Likewise, in France, the excep-
tion is narrowly drafted, and includes the situations
where it is demonstrated in concreto that granting
immediate access to a lawyer will interfere with the col-
lection of evidence, completing the investigation or will
cause risk to persons.129 A similar provision, referring to
‘exceptional circumstances’, exists in Scotland, but it
has not (yet) been defined by law when such circum-
stances may arise.130
Related to the issue of derogation from the right to legal
advice is the question of whether, and under which cir-
cumstances, the police may interrogate a suspect who
has not met with a lawyer and has not waived the right
124. See Sections 3.2 and 3.3 above.
125. See in particular Section 4.2.2 below in respect of the Netherlands.
126. Up to 36 hours in England and Wales in case of 'ordinary offences', and
up to 48 hours in case of 'terrorist offences'. In France, to the period of
maximum 12 or 48 hours in case of 'ordinary offences', and 72 hours in
case of 'organised and terrorist offences'. Blackstock et al., above n. 11
at 78, 92.
127. PACE, Sections 58 & 58A.
128. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 78.
129. Ibid. at 92.
130. Ibid. at 128.
to legal advice. The Directive provides for this to be
only possible in two situations, namely where it is neces-
sary to ‘avert serious adverse consequences for the life,
liberty or physical integrity of a person’131 or to ‘prevent
substantial jeopardy to criminal proceedings’.132 Only
the English law133 complies with these exceptions, stat-
ing that the police cannot interrogate suspects before
they have met a lawyer, subject to the exception men-
tioned in the paragraph above.134 In the Netherlands
and in France, by contrast, the police are entitled to
commence an interrogation if the lawyer does not arrive
within 2 hours from the moment he had been
notified.135 This is clearly in breach of the Directive136
and ECtHR case law.137 Even though the Directive pro-
vides for a possibility of a (temporary) derogation from
the right of access to a lawyer ‘where immediate action
by the investigation authorities is imperative to prevent
substantial jeopardy to criminal proceedings’,138 this
provision may hardly be used to justify a general norm
authorising the police to derogate from the right to legal
assistance due to the lawyer’s late arrival. According to
the Directive, derogations from the right of access to a
lawyer at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings are pos-
sible only in limited, exceptional, circumstances.139
They must furthermore be authorised on a case-by-case
basis following an examination of the existence of the
grounds for such derogation of the kind mentioned in
Article 3(6)(b).140 Clearly, a blanket authorization to
interrogate a suspect if a lawyer fails to meet with the
suspect within a certain (arbitrarily defined) time
period, without the requirement to assess whether the
grounds for derogation from the right of access to a law-
yer apply in each given case, does not comply with the
aforementioned provisions of the Directive.
In France and in the Netherlands, the 2-hour waiting
time before the police are entitled to commence an
interrogation translates into a regulation, requiring law-
yers to attend police stations within 2 hours. In England
and Wales, by contrast, there is no legal requirement for
lawyers to attend within a certain time. However, the
conditions of the contract, which the government
131. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Recital 31.
132. Ibid., Recital 32.
133. Note that the Scottish law on this issue is not yet adequately developed.
134. Code of Practice C, para. 6.6.
135. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 91, 268.
136. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Arts. 3(5) and
(6) and 8, Recitals 30-32.
137. See, in particular, Pischchalnikov v. Russia, Directive on the right of
access to a lawyer, above n. 50, 79: ‘Moreover, the Court is of the
opinion that an accused such as the applicant in the present case, who
had expressed his desire to participate in investigative steps only
through counsel, should not be subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conver-
sations with the police or prosecution.’
138. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 3(6)(b).
According to Recital 32, ‘substantial jeopardy’ means the risk of
destruction or alteration of ‘essential’ evidence and the risk of interfer-
ence with witnesses.
139. Ibid., Art. 3(6). Also see Recitals 30-2, which reflect the exceptional and
urgent nature of any derogations from the Directive.
140. Ibid., Art. 8(2) and (3).
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concludes with criminal defence lawyers wishing to
provide criminal legal aid services, include a target
attendance time of 45 minutes.141
In all examined jurisdictions, with the exception of
France, legally aided suspects may express a preference
for a certain lawyer to assist them in police custody.142
However, their choice – if they wish to have free legal
assistance – is limited to those lawyers who have signed
up for the provision of police station duty services. In
England and Wales, where the lawyer named by the sus-
pect cannot attend, officers must ask the suspect if he
wishes to consult another solicitor or to proceed without
a solicitor,143 whilst in the Netherlands there is no such
requirement. Thus, the Dutch authorities would be
entitled to appoint another lawyer to a legally aided sus-
pect ex officio, if the chosen lawyer is unavailable.144
4.2.2 Timely Access to a Lawyer of One’s Choice in
Practice
The arrangements for contacting and appointing law-
yers promptly upon detention worked rather efficiently
in all studied jurisdictions. This was possible due to the
existence of duty lawyer schemes, which ensured that
lawyers were contacted immediately, and that there
were lawyers available on short notice to provide advice
at police stations. Clearly, setting up such a scheme is
the only possible way to guarantee the right of timely
access to a lawyer in police custody.145
Similarly, the time limits set for making contact with
suspects were usually met by lawyers – although with a
caveat that in England and Wales lawyers have attended
their clients immediately before the interrogation, but
not at the very outset of detention (as the interrogation
normally took place towards the end of custody); and
that in Scotland most of legal advice was provided by
telephone.146
In the Netherlands it transpired from the observations
that, as far as duty lawyers were concerned, the 2-hour
time limit was usually met. Alternatively, lawyers were
able to find a replacement or to negotiate a later attend-
ance time with the police. Likewise, empirical research
conducted in parallel with this research project revealed
that this time limit did not appear to pose significant
problems in practice.147 However, sometimes ‘duty’
lawyers were unable to attend within the 2-hour time
limit. In such situations, police officers usually waited
141. Legal Aid Agency, 2010 Standard Crime Contract – Specification, para.
50, 9.52 (c), available at: <www. justice. gov. uk/ downloads/ legal -aid/
crime -contract -2010/ specification -2012 -part -b -apr -2012 -1 -apr -12. pdf>
(last visited 18 December 2013).
142. In France, suspects who have opted for a duty lawyer appointed by the
state could not choose a certain lawyer.
143. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 78.
144. Of course, the suspect would still be entitled to refuse to be assisted by
a lawyer altogether.
145. For more detail about the operation of the schemes, see Blackstock
et al., above n. 11 at 262-73.
146. See below.
147. Unless the police station was located some distance from the location of
the offices of the duty lawyer, or when this was combined with the law-
yer’s other commitments, such as calls from other police stations and
court appointments.
until the lawyer arrives and did not proceed with an
interrogation. Yet, the possibility that the police would
decide to interrogate a suspect without waiting for a
lawyer was not excluded. Indeed, one Dutch lawyer
reported that it had happened in one of her cases.148
In contrast to ‘duty’ lawyers in the Netherlands, when it
concerned ‘own’ lawyers, i.e. lawyers who were not on
duty but were named by suspects, it appears that for
many of them attending within 2 hours was problem-
atic.149 These lawyers were often engaged elsewhere, i.e.
with other clients or in court, and thus they were often
unable to attend the police station on short notice. If
they were unavailable to attend, these lawyers usually
made arrangements with the duty lawyer, or another
lawyer, to assist the suspect; or alternatively, police offi-
cers requested the duty lawyer to see the suspect. Often,
it emerged during the consultation that the suspect’s
opinion about the change of a lawyer was not asked
either by the lawyers150 or by the police.151 This was
true both for privately paying and legally aided suspects.
In fact, police officers did not know whether a certain
suspect was benefiting from legal aid or paying his law-
yer privately.152
Often, the fact that suspects’ consent to the change of a
lawyer was not asked provoked their mistrust of the
‘imposed’ lawyer, which in turn limited the lawyer’s
ability to give effective advice. For instance, in one case
observed in the Netherlands, a suspect of burglary, who
was attended by a ‘duty’ lawyer instead of a preferred
lawyer, refused to tell the lawyer about the circumstan-
ces of his arrest or his criminal record, or to respond to
any other questions posed by the lawyer. As a result, all
that the lawyer could achieve in the consultation was to
remind the suspect that he should ‘keep his mouth
shut’.153 This example demonstrates that having an
opportunity to meet with the lawyer who the suspect
knows and trusts is an important pre-requisite for
effective legal assistance. In other observed cases, the
assistance of the ‘duty’ lawyer, where the suspect has
expressed preference for an ‘own’ lawyer was less effi-
cient because the ‘duty’ lawyer did not know about the
suspect’s medical, family or criminal history
and therefore was unable to properly gauge his advice154
and/or identify and act upon any special needs of the
suspect.155
Our research on the Dutch sites demonstrated that it is
challenging to ensure that suspect’s choice of a lawyer is
148. NethSite2Law11.
149. During the observations with 'duty' lawyers, researchers often encoun-
tered suspects who were re-referred to a 'duty lawyer', because their
'own lawyer' could not timely attend.
150. NethSite1Law2; NethSite1Law9,
151. NethSite1Law11; NethSite1Law15; NethSite2Law12.
152. NethSite1Pol12; NethSite1Law11.
153. NethSite1Law11. The suspect had had previous experience with the
criminal justice system, and he knew about the right to remain silent.
154. For example, information about the criminal record is needed for a law-
yer to be able to predict how long a suspect may remain in detention.
155. In NethSite1Law5, a duty lawyer was invited to assist a suspect, who
had suffered from mental disability, but because he did not know his
medical history, he was unable to suggest to the police what kind of
protection measures may be needed.
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respected in the context of police detention. Lawyers
often have a busy schedule of court sessions and are
unable to attend with 2-hour notice, and the police are
under pressure – particularly in respect of minor
offences – to interrogate quickly in order to reduce the
suspect’s time in custody. In England and Wales, how-
ever, this problem did not surface to the same extent,
due to the differences in the organisation of the legal
profession. There, lawyers engaged in police station
advice were usually part of a criminal defence firm, and
clients and cases were shared within this firm. Thus, the
client’s choice was vested with the particular firm, rath-
er than with an individual lawyer, and as a rule, each law
firm had a member of staff available to attend police sta-
tions at any time.156
The lawyers’ professional ideologies and views of their
own role was another significant factor in ensuring time-
ly and effective access to a lawyer in police custody.
Thus, for example, for Dutch lawyers personal attend-
ance at a police station was a ‘norm’, and most of them
opposed the idea of providing legal advice by telephone
(even though advising suspects by phone would have
eliminated the need to organise timely attendance at
police station).157 Many Scottish lawyers, in contrast to
their Dutch colleagues, opted for providing advice to
suspects detained at police station by telephone, justify-
ing this by the fact that their only role is to advise sus-
pects to remain silent, but most probably doing so to
avoid the need to promptly attend suspects in person.158
Some Dutch and Scottish lawyers we observed appeared
to underappreciate the significance of timely attendance
of a client at police station, prioritising their other per-
sonal or professional tasks over assisting the client as
promptly as possible (e.g. failing to visit a suspect in the
evening if he was to be interrogated the following morn-
ing).159 Other Dutch lawyers have striven to meet with
the clients immediately after they were detained, also
late in the evening.160 The English lawyers, like the
Dutch lawyers, considered attendance of suspects in
person as a ‘norm’; however, they usually visited the
suspect just before the interrogation, but not at the very
outset of police custody.161 This left little room for law-
yers to ensure the suspect’s welfare and to provide
moral support to them throughout the police custody, as
the interrogation normally took place in the very end of
the custody period.
Furthermore, there were indications that in France, and
by some lawyers, albeit a minority in the Netherlands,
police station legal advice was seen as a one-off activity,
156. Although many firms employed so-called 'independent agents' to
attend police stations during anti-social hours. Blackstock et al., above
n. 11 at 263.
157. Ibid. at 287.
158. Ibid. at 288-89.
159. Ibid. at 429.
160. NethSite1Law15; NethSite2Law10; NethSite2Law5.
161. This was also partly due to the structure of the police station legal aid
fees. Lawyers received a fixed fee for police station legal advice, and
thus they could not claim additional compensation for several visits of a
client while in police custody. See generally Blackstock et al., above
n. 11 at 285, 429-30.
i.e. there was no expectation that the same lawyer would
continue to assist the suspect on the same case. Besides,
in France there was no procedure within the duty law-
yer scheme run by the local Bar to ensure that the same
lawyer would be invited to visit the suspect throughout
the police custody and beyond.162 This demonstrates
the underappreciation of the need for continuity of legal
advice by (some members of) the legal profession. In
contrast, in England and Wales and in the Netherlands,
there was an expectation that the same lawyer (in
England and Wales, the same firm) will continue assist-
ing the suspect throughout.
4.3 Lawyers' Presence and Role at Suspect
Interrogation
The provisions on the right to lawyer’s presence and the
role of a lawyer during the interrogation of a suspect
were among the most debated in the newly adopted
Directive. During the negotiations, there was opposition
to the idea of a universal right to have a lawyer present
or vesting him with anything more than an observatory
role during suspect’s interrogations.163 Therefore, the
implementation of the respective provisions of the
Directive is likely to be particularly challenging. Below
we set out the possible legal and practical obstacles to
the implementation of the right to have a lawyer present
at the interrogation and the right to effective assistance
of a lawyer therein, which may arise in the Member
States.
4.3.1 Regulations on Lawyers’ Presence and Their Role
during Suspect Interrogation
The suspect’s right to have a lawyer present at interrog-
ation has long been provided for in the law of England
and Wales.164 In France and Scotland, similar provi-
sions were introduced fairly recently.165 By contrast, in
the Netherlands there is no general right of suspects to
have their lawyer present in police interrogations. In the
Netherlands, juvenile suspects have the right to choose
between the presence of a lawyer or a ‘trusted person’,
i.e. a parent or a relative, at their interrogation. No other
categories of suspects have the right to have their lawyer
attend their questioning.166 In our view, Dutch law does
not comply with the ECtHR standards in this regard.
The ECtHR case law standards state unequivocally that
suspects must have the right to have their lawyer pres-
ent at their interrogations.167 Likewise, the Directive on
the right of access to a lawyer provides for the right of
162. Ibid. at 305-6.
163. See note by Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom dated 21 September 2011 to the Council of the EU
(2001/0154 (COD), No. 14495/11 expressing concerns about the pro-
posed Directive.
164. Since the entry into force of PACE in 1986. PACE, Section 58; PACE
Code of Practice C, para. 6.8.
165. For the relevant references to legislation and case law, see Blackstock
et al., above n. 11 at 97, 128.
166. For the relevant references to legislation and case law, see ibid. at 109.
167. The most recent case, where the ECtHR addresses specifically the right
to have a lawyer present during the interrogations, is Navone and oth-
ers v. Monaco, above at 4, 72-85.
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every suspect and accused person to ‘have their lawyer
present and participate effectively when questioned.’168
The extent to which the lawyer’s role during the inter-
rogation is regulated by law, and the scope of that role,
differs greatly per jurisdiction. The most detailed regu-
lation is to be found in England and Wales:
‘The solicitor’s only role in the police station is to
protect and advance the legal rights of their client…
The solicitor may intervene [in an interrogation] in
order to seek clarification, challenge an improper
question to their client or the manner in which it is
put, advise the client not to reply to particular ques-
tions, or if they wish to give their client further legal
advice.’169
170 This decision can only be made by a senior officer,
and if the decision is made to exclude the lawyer, the
suspect must be given the opportunity to consult anoth-
er solicitor. However, in practice lawyers are removed
from interrogations very rarely, and only when their
behaviour becomes seriously disruptive (e.g. shouting or
repeatedly responding to questions for his client).
France was the other country where the lawyer’s role at
interrogation was defined by statute, however in a much
more limited way than in England and Wales. There,
lawyers are not supposed to intervene during the inter-
rogation, except for at the end of the interrogation to ask
questions to the suspect or to make remarks.171 If law-
yers do not adhere to these provisions, police officers are
entitled to stop the interrogation and request for another
lawyer to be appointed.172
In contrast to England and Wales and France, in the
Netherlands and Scotland there is no statutory defini-
tion of the role of a lawyer during interrogation. Some
provisions are to be derived from the various instruc-
tions adopted by the prosecutor’s office or the police;173
however, it is unclear whether they are binding on law-
yers. In Scotland, these documents envisage a broad role
for a lawyer during interrogation, although not as broad
as in England and Wales. Namely, lawyers may advise
their clients, including advice not to respond to ques-
tions, seek to ensure that clients understand questions
and object to oppressive questioning or improper behav-
iour by the police.174 In the Netherlands, lawyers may
only intervene to ensure that the suspect understands
the question posed by the police, to ensure that no
undue pressure is applied on him and to propose correc-
tions to the interrogation record. If lawyers fail to abide
by these rules, they can be excluded from the interroga-
tion.175
168. Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, above n. 5, Art. 3(3)(b).
169. PACE Code of Practice C, Note for Guidance 6D.
170. PACE Code of Practice C, paras. 6.9-6.11.
171. Art. 63-4-3 French CCP.
172. Ibid.
173. For references to the relevant acts, see Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at
115-16, 397 and 400.
174. Ibid. at 400-1.
175. Aanwijzing rechtsbijstand politieverhoor 15 februari 2010, Stcrt. 2010,
4003.
Moreover, in France and in the Netherlands the nation-
al (criminal) Bar associations adopted alternative sets of
guidelines, which encourage their members to take a
more active stance during the suspect interrogation than
provided for in the law or in the internal law enforce-
ment regulations.176 However, it appears that these
guidelines remain largely aspirational until the Directive
is implemented in national law.177
4.3.2  Lawyers’ Presence and Role at Interrogations in
Practice
Significant differences were observed as to whether law-
yers attended the interrogations of suspects by the
police during police custody. In England and Wales and
in France, there was a general expectation that a lawyer
would attend all custodial interrogations of a suspect,
and the lawyers we observed did in fact do so.178 By
contrast, Scottish lawyers usually did not attend inter-
rogations, because they preferred to deal with the entire
police station legal advice by telephone.179 Dutch law-
yers appeared to attend suspect interrogations rarely,
even when they were entitled to do so (i.e. in the case of
juveniles).180
The roles that lawyers exercised during the interroga-
tion, and the degree to which they intervened181 at
interrogations, varied even more between the four juris-
dictions. Lawyers in England and Wales were generally
more interventionist than the lawyers in the other three
countries, which is to be explained by a combination of
reasons, such as: clear and detailed regulations as to
when lawyers may intervene and for what purpose;
existence of an accreditation process, which aims to test
lawyers’ skills in intervening; and greater acceptance by
the police of lawyer’s presence and their role at the
interrogation than in the other three jurisdictions.182
In Inside Police Custody, we identified a range of factors,
other than the existence of relevant legislation, which
determined whether lawyers were present at interroga-
tions of their clients, and whether they assumed an
active role during such interrogations.183 These were the
factors related to the payment for police station legal
176. Ibid. at 405.
177. The Dutch government has introduced legislative proposals to imple-
ment the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in February 2014
(i.e. in the period after the completion of our research). These proposals
provide for the right of access to a lawyer during interrogations of all
suspects by police, and give more rights to lawyers to intervene during
the interrogation. See Wetsvoorstel implementatie richtlijn Recht op
toegang raadsman, available at: <www. rijksoverheid. nl/ documenten -en -
publicaties/ kamerstukken/ 2014/ 02/ 13/ westvoorstel -implementatie -
richtlijn -recht -op -toegang -raadsman. html> (last visited 10 June 2014);
Besluit inrichting en orde politieverhoor, available at: <www.
rijksoverheid. nl/ documenten -en -publicaties/ besluiten/ 2014/ 02/ 13/ besluit
-inrichting -en -orde -politieverhoor. html> (last visited 10 June 2014).
178. Ibid. at 385.
179. Ibid. at 386-87.
180. In our sample, from seventeen observed interrogations involving a juve-
nile, lawyers were present only in eight of them. Ibid. at 386. For similar
findings, see Verhoeven and Stevens, above n. 114 at 266-68.
181. By “intervention” at the interrogation we mean a verbal remark or
question, aimed to fulfill one of the purposes set out in the general
description of the lawyer’s role as described above in Section 3.3.1.
182. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 396-97.
183. Ibid. at 387-408.
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advice, organisational factors related to the delivery of
legal advice as well as the planning of police interroga-
tions, the attitudes of the police to the lawyer’s presence
and role at the interrogation and the respective lawyers’
professional attitudes. These factors will be briefly
addressed below.
One important factor that influenced the attendance of
interrogations was the organisation of the duty lawyer
schemes and the structure of remuneration for legal
advice. Thus, for instance, in England and Wales and in
France there were financial incentives for the lawyers to
attend suspect interrogations,184 because attendance of
interrogation was paid at a significantly higher rate than
a prior consultation with the client. In the Netherlands,
by contrast, the payment structure discouraged
attendance of interrogations, because lawyers were paid
significantly less pro rata for the time spent in attending
an interrogation than for a pre-interrogation consulta-
tion.185 However, the financial arrangements were not
the only, or even a determinative, factor. The way in
which police station legal assistance schemes were
organised also had an impact on lawyers’ attendance.
Thus, in England and Wales and in France, lawyers
were expected to attend interrogations if they accepted
appointment for police station legal advice (for instance,
in France they had to report on such attendance to the
Bar coordinator in order to collect a fee), and if a lawyer
knew that he would have no time to attend the interrog-
ation, he was expected to refuse providing assistance to
the client altogether. In the Netherlands, by contrast,
duty lawyers appeared to prefer to take up most
requests for legal advice personally, and generally did
not re-refer the client to another lawyer if they did not
have time to attend the interrogation.186
Another factor that influenced whether lawyers attend-
ed interrogations was the way in which the police
approached the planning of interrogations. Generally, in
none of the four jurisdictions with the exception of
England and Wales, was there an expectation that the
police would adjust the timing of the interrogation to
the lawyer’s availability.187 Furthermore, in one of the
French sites, there was not even a standing practice that
the police would give lawyers a margin of 1 hour to
organise attendance of suspect interrogation (where this
was a second or a third interrogation of a suspect in cus-
tody).188
Lawyers' own attitudes to attendance and their
understanding of their role during the interrogation
were other factors that determined attendance. As our
study revealed, lawyers in different jurisdictions gave
different, and sometimes contradictory, justifications as
184. Ibid. at 388.
185. At the time of the fieldwork, a 30-minute consultation was paid at EUR
85-255, and attendance of interrogation was paid at a fee of EUR
113-339 notwithstanding its duration (which could be several hours).
See ibid. at 117-18, 388.
186. Ibid. at 389.
187. In England and Wales, regulations provide that the police should nor-
mally wait for the lawyer’s arrival before commencing an interrogation.
PACE Code of Practice C, para. 6.8, Note for Guidance 6A.
188. Blackstock et al., above n. 11 at 391.
to why their attendance at interrogations was unnecessa-
ry.189 For instance, most Scottish lawyers believed that
they did not have to attend if they had advised clients to
remain silent at the interrogation. By contrast, one
Dutch lawyer said that he thought it was unnecessary to
attend where a suspect was going to respond to ques-
tions at the interrogation.190
In the Netherlands, some lawyers told us that they
believed it was important to attend every suspect inter-
rogation, however minor the offence that their client
was suspected of. Others said that they would attend
interrogation selectively, depending on the seriousness
of the case or the clients’ wishes.191 Furthermore, law-
yers’ attitudes to attending interrogations may have
played a role in their decision whether or not to
attend.192 Many of the Dutch lawyers, for example,
expressed rather negative attitudes to being present at
interrogations. The passivity of their role at the inter-
rogation, absence of prior knowledge about the evidence
(other than from the suspect) and the length and slow
pace of interrogations, coupled with low remuneration,
all contributed to the fact that many Dutch lawyers per-
ceived the attendance of interrogations as not the most
interesting or challenging part of their job.193 In
Scotland, some of the interviewed lawyers had
expressed little interest in attending interrogations,
because ‘everything was tape-recorded anyway’.194
As far as the lawyers’ role at interrogations was con-
cerned, the main factor that influenced the way it was
shaped in the different jurisdictions, besides the exis-
tence of clear and detailed regulations that defined the
lawyers’ role, were the professional attitudes of the
police towards lawyers. There was a stark difference in
the way that lawyers who attended interrogations were
perceived and treated by the police in England and
Wales (a jurisdiction which has significantly longer
experience with police station legal advice) and the other
three jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, and to some
extent in France, police officers have expressed general-
ly neutral or negative attitudes towards the presence of a
lawyer at interrogations, however, most of them have
shown strong opposition to the idea that lawyers should
be able to play any active role in the interrogation.195
Different strategies were observed aimed at diminishing
the effect of the lawyer’s presence on the course of the
interrogation. Thus, for example, in the Netherlands
lawyers were sometimes required to go to the adjacent
recording room, if the interrogation was audiovisually
recorded, which prevented them from intervening in
any way (as well as from seeing clearly what is happen-
ing in the interrogation room).196 If lawyers were pres-
189. Ibid. at 392.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid. at 392-94.
193. Ibid. at 393.
194. This view is, however, not accurate, which also reflects on how little
(some) Scottish lawyers are familiar with the police detention proce-
dure. Ibid. at 393.
195. Ibid. at 402-3.
196. Ibid.
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ent in the room, they were sometimes placed behind the
suspect or in the corner, to prevent the possibility of eye
contact between the lawyer and the suspect, and to sym-
bolically remove the lawyer from the interrogation
table.197 Another technique, used rather commonly, was
to reprimand a lawyer for ‘obstructionist’ behaviour and
to threaten to remove a lawyer from an interrogation
room.198 Similarly, in France lawyers appeared to be
threatened with the so-called ‘incident report’, i.e. a
request made by the police to the Bar to appoint another
lawyer instead of the one who aims to ‘obstruct’ an
interrogation.
Where the general attitude of the police towards law-
yers’ interventions is hostile, it is difficult to expect that
an ‘interventionist’ culture of legal assistance during
suspect interrogations would emerge without a concert-
ed action on behalf of the legal profession. Such action
should be aimed at defining clearly the lawyer’s role at
interrogations and at training lawyers to intervene
appropriately and assertively. For example, the findings
of our study analysed together with the findings of
earlier research suggest that in England and Wales law-
yers’ participation in interrogations, and their interven-
tions have significantly increased after the Law Society
introduced police station legal advice training and
accreditation schemes, which inter alia required lawyers
to react in situations when an intervention was called
for, and to respond to them appropriately.199
5 Conclusions
The Directive on the right of access to a lawyer is an
important step on the path towards the development of
a fair and effective system of protection of suspects’ pro-
cedural rights in the EU. However, it is only the first
step. To ensure that the Directive applies directly in a
police station located in the Scottish Highlands or in the
heart of Amsterdam, further measures will have to be
taken by the Member States, national Bars and legal
professions. Thus, transposition of the Directive into
national laws of the Member States will require the
development of complex nationwide programmes,
accompanied by a range of organisational and policy
measures and training of relevant criminal justice per-
sonnel. The European Union institutions may assist the
Member States in this respect by providing guidance
and financial or institutional support.
Based on the analysis of the regulations and practice of
the implementation of the right to legal assistance in the
four European jurisdictions, we propose below a range
of measures which, in our view, should accompany the
adoption of legislation implementing the Directive.200
These measures could also be incorporated in the review
197. Ibid.
198. Ibid. at 404.
199. Ibid. at 405.
200. This list builds upon, and develops the list of measures proposed in Ibid.
at 451-57.
procedure by the European Commission which has to
be presented to the European Parliament and to the
Council 1 year after the relevant transposition date to
assess compliance of the Member States with the
Directive.
5.1 Information on the Right to Legal Advice
and Waiver
– Detailed procedures on informing suspects about the
right to legal advice should be developed, which
should avoid using prescriptive language, but define
the content and the manner in which the information
should be provided (e.g. both orally and in writing, in
a clear and understandable manner, with appropriate
detail, and avoiding formal or officious language.
Information on the right to legal advice should be
provided by a police officer who is independent from
the investigation.
– Officers should be trained to deliver the information
about the right to legal assistance in a neutral manner
and to encourage suspects to take up this right in
appropriate circumstances (e.g. serious cases, vulner-
able suspects). The use of tactics aimed at dissuading
suspects from the exercise of the right to legal advice
should be prohibited. Caution should be exercised
when informing suspects that taking up the right to a
lawyer will cause delay, as it is likely to dissuade them
from obtaining legal advice. Officers should be
trained to avoid shortcuts when informing suspects
about their rights, when it concerns suspects who had
previous experiences of police custody.
– Detailed regulations should be developed on the con-
ditions for a waiver of the right to legal assistance,
and the procedure to ascertain whether the waiver
was valid (i.e. informed and voluntary). These regula-
tions should include the obligation to ask for reasons
for the waiver and to record these reasons, as well as
to react appropriately, should it appear that the waiv-
er is ill-informed.
– Special procedures should be developed to inform
vulnerable suspects about the right to legal advice,
depending on the nature of their vulnerability and
age. Other mechanisms to facilitate the provision of
information to such suspects should be considered,
such as the institution of an ‘appropriate adult’. In
addition, consideration should be given to developing
regulations according to which some categories of
suspects, e.g. very young children or particularly vul-
nerable suspects, should not be able to waive their
right to a lawyer.
5.2 Timely Access to a Lawyer of One’s Choice
– Legislation aimed at implementing the Directive
should include a provision prohibiting the com-
mencement of interrogation before the suspect had an
opportunity to exercise the right. Any exceptions to
this provision should be drawn narrowly in line with
the Directive. Failure of the lawyer to arrive at the
police station within a certain time should not consti-
tute a legitimate exception to this provision.
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– Duty lawyer schemes should be introduced to ensure
that lawyers are available to provide advice at police
stations on short notice. There should also be a corre-
sponding obligation of the police to engage the duty
lawyer scheme in a timely fashion and to facilitate
effective access to a lawyer.
– Detailed procedures should be developed to ensure
that suspects’ wishes to be advised by a particular
lawyer or by a particular law firm are taken into
account. Police officers should be trained to recognise
the importance of assistance by a lawyer of one’s
choice and continuity of legal advice. In any case,
suspects who pay for a lawyer privately should be
able to benefit from the assistance of their own law-
yer.
– Measures should be taken to encourage timely
attendance of police stations by lawyers, for instance,
by incorporating relevant attendance time targets as
conditions for participation in the duty lawyer
scheme. Lawyers should be encouraged to organise
their practice in such a way as to ensure that there is
staff available to attend police stations at any time, as
well as to guarantee the continuity of legal advice.
– Lawyers should be trained to recognise the impor-
tance of personal attendance as soon as possible after
the moment of detention, and of continuity of legal
assistance.
5.3 Presence of Lawyers at the Interrogation and
Their Role
– Measures should be taken to stimulate lawyers’
attendance of suspect interrogations, such as
developing appropriate fee structures, as well as other
organisational measures, e.g. requiring attendance of
interrogations as a condition for participation in the
duty lawyer scheme or for receiving a police station
advice fee.
– Lawyers should be trained to understand the impor-
tance of attending interrogations, even in seemingly
trivial matters. Measures should be taken to
encourage the development of such a defence culture,
where attendance at interrogations is considered an
indispensable element of the lawyer’s role in police
custody.
– Clear and unequivocal regulations of the lawyer’s role
during interrogation should be developed. These reg-
ulations must contain provisions concerning when it
is appropriate for lawyers to intervene and for which
purpose and what means of intervening should be
available to a lawyer. The regulation should also
include provisions on where it is appropriate for an
officer to exclude the lawyer from the interview,
which should be narrowly drawn.
– Regulations should be developed prohibiting officers
from engaging in certain strategies aimed at
diminishing the effect of lawyers’ presence at inter-
rogations. Officers should be trained to recognise the
importance of an active lawyer’s role during interroga-
tions.
– Lawyers should be trained to assume an active role
during suspect interrogations, and in particular to
recognise the moments when it is appropriate to
intervene and to respond appropriately to the
strategies aimed to diminish their impact during inter-
rogations.
205
Anna Ogorodova & Taru Spronken ELR December 2014 | No. 4
